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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
Amicus curiae Utah Association of Counties ("UAC") is a voluntary non-profit
organization whose directors are selected from the elected county officials of the 29
counties of Utah. Formed in 1924, UAC assists county commissioners, council members
and other county officials by lobbying and advocating for federal and state legislative and
administrative action and at times litigating for judicial decisions and outcomes that are
beneficial to the counties of Utah and county residents. Counties in Utah are vitally
interested in maintaining the public nature of the roads which comprise the inventory of
each county's public transportation system. UAC, on behalf of its member counties who
maintain thousands of miles of rural county public roads like the one at issue in the
present case, has a substantial interest in advising the Court as to the proper interpretation
and application of public road dedication laws.
The issue framed in this Court's March 15, 2007 Order granting certiorari is
"Whether the district court and court of appeals erred in their application of the standards
for ascertaining a continuous use as a public thoroughfare pursuant to the Dedication
Statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-104(1)." This review will examine the public nature of a
road in light of asserted periodic interruption of public use in decades past. That will bear
on the validity of the many thousands of miles of county public land rural road claims
with which UAC is involved statewide. UAC wishes to advise why the Court of Appeals
holding presents a workable, practicable solution that best weighs public and private

1

interests, a solution that helps counties meet the challenge of maintaining rural public
transportation systems in harmony with the interests of entities like amicus curiae
Brigham Young University.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Competent evidence of record supports the trial court's findings and conclusions
that the public continuously used the four subject roads as public thoroughfares for more
than ten years. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law properly resolved
conflicting trial testimony by deciding who and what to believe and entering findings and
conclusions accordingly. The trial court correctly applied the law to its findings to
determine that the subject roads were public roads. The trial transcript demonstrates that
sufficient competent evidence supports the trial court's findings. There was ample
testimony showing the public used the subject roads as public thoroughfares continuously
from the 1950s up to the late 1980s or early 1990s. There was also ample testimony
showing that up until the late 1980s if not later, members of the public did not encounter
any locked gates on the subject roads and could pass through those gates freely. The
transcript shows that if the trial court erred at all, it did so by over-generously finding that
prior to the 1990s the landowners locked the gates at various times in the past for several
days at a time. Not that it much matters, however, since the trial court still correctly
found that any such pattern of pre-1990s gate locking did not prevent the public from
using the subject roads as often as they found it necessary and convenient.

2

However the controversy over the locked gates may be characterized, the transcript
even more clearly supports the trial court's findings when read in light of established
Utah Supreme Court precedent that grants trial courts wide discretion in public road
dedication cases. Under this precedent the Court of Appeals correctly drew inferences in
the light most favorable to the trial courtfindings,deferred to the trial court to resolve
disputed facts, granted the trial court a fair degree of latitude to determine the legal
consequences of the facts it did find, and considered all facts together, not in isolation.
The correct legal test to determine whether public use of the subject roads was
continuous does not turn on the mere erection of gates, signs or locks. The correct
standard focuses on the extent of public travel: did it occur as often as the public found it
necessary or convenient. The Court of Appeals' balancing test is the best logical
application of this "necessary and convenient" test. This Court should adopt that analysis
and affirm.

3

ARGUMENT
A,

Competent Evidence Of Record Supports the Trial Court's Findings and
Conclusions That the Public Continuously Used the Four Subject Roads as
Public Thoroughfares For More Than Ten Years
1.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Properly
Resolved Conflicting Trial Testimony

Statements in the trial court's initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Initial Findings and Conclusions"), Record ("R.") at 409-420, and Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Order on Motion to Amend Judgment ("Supplemental Findings"), R.
481-489, can be classified into the following four categories: the testimony and claims
presented by defendant/petitioners ("the landowners"), the testimony and claims
presented by plaintiff/respondent ("Wasatch County" or "the County"), the court's actual
findings of fact, and the court's actual conclusions of law.1
a.

The Landowners' Testimony Went One Direction

The trial court acknowledged the following testimony as having been adduced by
the landowners and received at trial:
Ridge Line Road and Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to
public use. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 4 ^ 14. R. 417.

1

Some of categories overlap and intermingle at times within a given
paragraph of the Initial Findings and Conclusions and Supplemental Findings, which is
understandable given the "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous" nature the
factual and legal requirements at issue herein. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d
307, 311 (Utah 1997).
4

Large numbers of people asked permission to use the subject roads. Id, at 4 ^f 15.
R.417.
Landowners' employees asked people not to use the subject roads at various
times. Id, at 4-5ffl[16-17. R. 416-417. Supplemental Findings, at 17. R. 488.
Gates on the subject roads were generally closed from the beginning of their
ownership in order to control livestock and restrict travel on the roads. Initial Findings
and Conclusions, at 5 If 17. R. 416.
Gates on the subject roads were in place as far back as 1957, but concededly they
were not always locked and did not prevent travel. Id, at 6 ^f 3. R. 415.
Beginning in the 1960s gates were "periodically locked for several days at a time"
and "No Trespassing - Private Property" signs were posted on the gates." Id, at 6 % 3. R.
415.
b.

The County's Testimony Went The Opposite Direction

The trial court acknowledged the following testimony as having been adduced by
the County and received at trial:
Although the subject roads had no trespassing signs and gates, the gates were not
locked until the 1990s. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 4 ^f 11-12. R. 417.
Despite the presence of no-trespassing markers and gates on the subject roads, the
public was able to freely use those roads continuously for many more than ten years for
recreational purposes until the gates were locked in the early 1990s. Id.
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Prior to their being locked, the existence of the gates on the subject roads did not
interrupt the public's use of the roads. Id., at 4 ^ 12. R. 417.
The persons who used the subject roads were members of the general public
without any private right to use those roads. Id., at 4 ^f 11. R. 417.
The landowners between the 1950s and late 1980s asked people not to go on their
private property adjoining the subject roads, but not until the 1990s did the landowners
impede traffic on the actual roads themselves. Id, at 4 ^f 13. R. 417.
Any gates that existed on the subject roads were not locked until the 1990s, and
once no trespassing signs were posted they seemed to refer only to property abutting the
roads and not the roads themselves. Id., at 6 f 3. R. 415.
c.

Out of This Pointed Factual Dispute, The Trial Court Decided
Who and What To Believe and Made Findings and Conclusions
Accordingly

The trial court found in relevant part:
The four subject roads are Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow2 Road, Parker
Canyon Road and Ridge Line Road. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 2 \ 3. R. 419.
The four subject roads are mountainous roads typically accessed by pickup truck,
snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles, and they either begin and end at points outside the
landowners' property or connect with roads that do. Id., at 2fflf4-6 and 3 ^ 6 . R. 418-

Referenced often in the trial transcript as Thorton "Hallow" Road.
6

419.3
In the early 1990s the landowners started selling "trespass permits" to allow
persons to hunt, gather wood and camp on their property. Id., at 4 \ 18. R. 416.
In the mid 1990s up through the present, the landowners allowed their land to
become a private hunting unit, id, at ^f 19, R. 416, allowing private hunters to access the
land in return for a significant monetary payment. Supplemental Findings, at \ 9. R. 487.
Beginning in the 1990s, landowners began restricting access to the roads. Id., at ^f
7. R. 488.
At various times in the past (no specificity as to the dates or frequency), the
landowners and their employees have locked these gates for several days at a time, but
beginning in the 1990s the landowners began locking these gates on a more permanent
basis. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6fflf3-4, Supplemental Findings, at^f 5. R.
415,488.
The landowners posted "no trespassing signs" at various places along these roads.
Supplemental Findings, at % 6. R. 488.
Nevertheless, the facts of the present case are "similar to the facts of Boyer v.
Clark,4 where the public, though not consisting of a great many persons, made a
continuous and uninterrupted use of the roads as often as they found it convenient and
3

There are duplicate numbered paragraphs 6 and 7 in the Initial Findings,
one pair on page 2 and the other pair on page 3. R. 418-419.
4

326 P. 2d 107 (Utah 1958).
7

necessary. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6-7 ^ 4. R. 414-415.5
Taking even the landowners' factual assertions as true concerning gates being
locked "at various times in the past" "for several days at a time,"6 it is clear that
5

The relevant facts in Boyer are:

The use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had
need to travel it, but those of the public who had such need, did so.
326 P.2d 107,108 (Utah 1958).
Within the past few years prior to the trial of this action in 1956, both
appellant and respondent have put no trespassing signs on their properties
and have attempted to charge deer hunters who wanted to use their
properties. However, no objection was made nor did any of the owners of
property over which the trail traversed attempt to interfere in the public's
use until respondent tried to prevent such use a short time before this action
was commenced.
Id. at 108-109.
The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case disclosed that for a period
exceeding 50 years, the public, even though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of Middle Canyon Road,
in traveling by wagon and other vehicles and by horse from Upton to Grass
Creek and other points as often as they found it convenient or necessary.
Id. at 109.
6

Given the context of the trial court's statement, "Taking even the
Defendants' factual assertions as true," Initial Findings and Conclusions, \ 4, R. 415, the
only logical meaning of that statement is that the trial court takes as true the landowners
assertion that the gates have been locked "at various times in the past" "for several days
at a time." The landowners' transparent suggestion that the trial court by this statement
apparently swallowed as true every other item of testimony adduced by the landowners at
trial, makes no sense. That suggestion conveniently ignores the overall findings
themselves and ignores the subject statement's context in juxtaposition to the paragraph
that preceded it. If the trial court had taken all testimony and claims adduced and asserted
8

individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s
used the road without interruption, they used the roads freely, and through not constantly,
they used the roads as often as they needed. Id, at 6 ^f 4. R. 415.
The individuals who have used the roads did so in their capacity as members of the
general public, and used the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation,
prior to the landowners' locking of the gates in the early 1990s. Id, at 7 1 6, R. 414.
Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the landowners began locking the gates
and selling hunting permits, the subject roads were accessible and used by the general
public as often as they found necessary and convenient. Id, at 8 ^f 7. R. 413.
d.

The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Law to Its Findings To
Determine that the Subject Roads Were Public Roads

The trial court made the following conclusions of law:
There was non-permissive continuous public use of the subject roads as often as
the public found it convenient and necessary. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6-7 ^
2-4. R. 414-415.

by the landowners as true, then the Court's actual written and signed Initial Findings and
Conclusions and Supplemental Findings wherein the trial court took pains to expressly
enter so many findings and conclusions in the County's favor, would be nonsensical.
This Court should not countenance the landowner's suggestion. See Bonner v. Sudbury,
417 P. 2d 646, 647 (Utah 1966) (Appellate court when reviewing claims that public road
dedication rulings lack evidentiary support, should "analyze the evidence and whatever
reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings
and judgment.") and Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah
1981).
9

Prior to the locking of the gates in the early 1990s, members of the general public
as opposed to adjacent landowners or individuals with permission used the subject roads
as public thoroughfares to public lands and/or recreation. Id., at 7 Tfl[ 5-6. R. 414.
The continuous use of the subject roads as public thoroughfares lasted more than a
period often years, from 1960 until the early 1990s when the landowners began locking
the gates and selling hunting permits. Id., at 8 ^f 7. R. 413.
2

The Transcript Demonstrates That Sufficient Competent Evidence
Supports the Trial Court's Findings

Trial court findings are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard set forth
in Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).7 State v. Pena} 869 P.2d 932,935 (Utah 1994). Given this
standard, public road dedication trial court findings may not be overturned "unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against them." Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches,
639 P.2d 211,213 (Utah 1981).8 No legal basis exists for overturning such findings
unless they go "against the clear weight of evidence" or otherwise cause a reviewing
7

Rule 52(a) states in relevant part: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."
8

Moreover, an appellant who challenges trial court findings must marshal
and recite all facts for the reviewing court, whether or not favorable to their position.
Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah 1972) (In rejecting challenge to trial court's
determination that a road had not been subject to ten years continuous public use, Court
noted that appellants "chose to recite evidence most favorable to its contention to the
exclusion of other evidence favorable to [respondents], which is not permissable on
appellate review[.]"). It is doubtful whether the landowners' opening brief satisfies this
duty.
10

court to "reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Western
Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376,
1377 (Utah 1987). Reading the testimony documented in the following pages of trial
court transcripts produces a definite andfirmconviction that the trial court's findings are
correct, they are just, they are right, they ferret out who is credible and who is not, and
they go with the clear weight of evidence:
a.

Testimony Showing The Public Used the Subject Roads As Public
Thoroughfares Continuously from The 1950s up to The Late 1980s
or Early 1990s.

Circle Springs Road:

Trial Transcript of June 28, 2004 proceedings ("6-28-04 TR")
at 31:23-32:23; 33:3-9, 19-24,34:13-15, 19-21, 100:1104:14, 105:20-24, 148:6 -149:6, 186:5 -187:22, 190:3-20,
265:14-267:6,268:12-25.

Ridge Line Road:

6-28-04 TR at 37:2-5, 37:22 - 38:1, 38:2-18, 38:24 - 39:6,
106:9 - 107:13,111:17-22, 113:6-9. 119:11 - 121:8, 190:21 192:3,269:1 -271:1.

Thorton Hallow Road:

6-28-04 TR at 41:13 -42:20,42:21 -43:9,107:14- 110:7,
116:9-117:6,271:25-273:20.

Parker Canyon Road:

6-28-04 TR at 46:2-47:2, 121:13 - 125:12,274:1-275:10,
277:12 - 278:11. Trial Transcript of June 29, 2004
proceedings ("6-29-04 TR") at 74:10 - 76:11.
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The four roads in general: 6-28-04 TR at 15-17.
b.

Testimony Showing That Up Until The Late 1980s ifNot Later,
Members of the Public Did Not Encounter Any Locked Gates
On The Subject Roads.

Circle Springs Road:

6-28-04 TR at 35:11-15, 81:7-12, 104:15-18, 187:23 - 188:1,
267:25 - 268:11, 287:15-21. 6-29-04 TR at 9:25 -10:1,
63:18-20, 64:6 - 65:18,101:13-16.

Ridge Line Road:

6-28-04 TR at 39:16-39,40:4-6,14-16, 81:13-16,111:20 112:11; 113:20-22, 192:7-8, 271:2-4, cf 314:15-315:1 (there
could have been locks in 1980's, but we just threw our bikes
over the fence, climbed over and continued on). 6-29-04 TR
at 11:10-14, 13:6-9, 104:14-16.

Thorton Hallow Road:

6-28-04 TR at 43:14-25,118:23-24,273:21-25. 6-29-04 TR
71:9-10,76.

Parker Canyon Road:

6-28-04 TR at 47:19-48:4, 125:11-15, 275:11-12,278:12-13.
6-29-04 TR at 76:12-14.

The four roads in general: 6-28-04 TR at 64:8-14, 83:20-25.
At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred for not achieving a "definite and
firm conviction" that the trial court made a mistake in finding they way it did. Given the
foregoing testimony, that definite feeling was just not there for the Court of Appeals to
experience.

12

3.

The Transcript Shows That If The Trial Court Erred at All, It Did So By
Over-Generously Finding That Prior to the 1990s the Landowners Locked
The Gates At Various Times In the Past For Several Days At A Time.

This point may be academic as the trial court still correctly found that any such
pattern of pre-1990s gate locking did not prevent the public from using the subject roads
as often as they found it necessary and convenient. But this Court should be advised that
the transcript shows evidentiary support is spare and stinting at best for the notion that the
landowners before the 1990s locked the gates "at various times in the past" "for several
days at a time." Following is an analysis of the transcript:
a.

Circle Springs Road

A witness for landowners said a gate on the Circle Springs Road always had a
chain and lock on it. 6-29-04 TR at 133:25 - 134:3. Yet he admitted that every week the
gate itself was put up, it was ripped out the next day. 6-29-04 TR at 134:12-14.
Another witness for landowners said gates on Circle Springs Road were locked,
but he was never asked by landowners' counsel to specify the dates, frequency and
duration of such locking. 6-29 TR at 161:11 -19.
Lee Okelberry, who is not a party but is a brother and uncle to defendants and their
long time business partner and co-landowner before selling out to them several years prior
to the 2004 trial, said you could not keep a gate on the Circle Springs Road, that anybody
was free to use that road whether they asked permission or not. 6-29-04 TR at 193:18 194:13,204:16-22,205:12-16.
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b.

Ridge Line Road

A witness for landowners said gates on the Ridge Line Road were locked as far
back as 20 years. 6-29-04 TR at 160:6-19. 20 years prior to the trial is 1984. That
testimony does not contradict plaintiffs evidence that the gates were not locked during
the 1950s, '60s, '70s and early '80s..
A subsequently called witness for defendants said when he was on and around the
subject roads from 1952 to 1957, he never saw locks on any of the seven gates along the
Ridge Line Road. Trial Transcript of June 30,2004 proceedings ("6-30-04 TR") at 10:310; 15:20-16:1.
c.

Thorton Hallow Road

The undersigned could be mistaken, but the undersigned represents to this Court
that upon a careful review of the entire trial transcript he did not detect any testimony
regarding locks on gates specific to the Thorton Hallow road.
d.

Parker Canyon Road

A witness for landowners was asked if gates in Parker Canyon Road had ever been
locked and he said yes. But inexplicably the witness was never asked to state when that
occurred. 6-29-04 TRat 162:4-9.
e.

Four Roads in General

Defendants' own counsel said in his opening statement that his clients began to
lock the gates in the late 1970's. "The evidence will show that those fences and those

14

roads have been there continuously since 1957. Not only have there been gates there, but
they - - Beginning in about the 19, late 1970's they began to lock those gates." 6-28-04
TR at 8:7-9. (Emphasis added).9
A current hunting guide on defendants' property said the road gates are locked
during the hunting season. But again he was never asked to state what years these locks
were in place. Notably, the witness admitted he has been on and around the property only
since 1994. 6-29-04 TR at 233:7-23, 237:11-25,238:18-22.
A former hunting guide on landowners' property from the 1990s to 2001 referred
to locks being blown off of gates during this time period. 6-29-04 TR at 256:24 - 257:5,
257:17-18; 260:19. In what is either a transcription error or a mis-speak by trial counsel,
there is a question and answer exchange with this witness that refers to two locked gates,
the location of which is not clear from the record, from "1996 to 1990." 6-29 TR at
267:1-13. By the context of questions that follow, counsel and the witness may have
been intending to focus on the 196(5-1990 time period.
Lee Okelberry, a brother and uncle of the petitioner/landowners and their longtime business partner and co-owner of the subject property before selling out to them
several years prior to the trial, was called to testify for the landowners. Remarkably, Lee
Okelberry was not asked once in direct examination if any of the gates on the subject

9

Granted this statement by counsel is not evidence, but it sure does not go
very far to produce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial
court for finding ten years continuous public use.
15

roads were ever locked. 6-29-04 TR at 172-187. On cross examination, Lee Okelberry
testified that members of the public got to using the subject roads more and more over the
years when he was there, to the point that the gates themselves were disappearing. 6-2904 TR at 185:19 - 186:23. Lee Okelberry also testified on cross examination that the
Okelberrys never did lock anybody out of there. 6-29 TR at 186:21-24, 195:24 -196:2-3.
/

Petitioners Brian and Lee Okelberry Turned Out to Be Their
Own Weakest Evidentiary Links For Establishing That Gates
Were Locked Prior to the 1980s.

Petitioner/landowner Brian Okelberry, son of co-petitioner/landowner Ray
Okelberry and nephew to prior non-party witness Lee Okelberry, recalls putting one lock
on a gate once, and that was not even for a boundary access gate to their property but
rather for a gate in the interior of their property. What is worse, Brian was not asked to
state when this occurred, i,.e., when he put up the one lock on an interior gate. 6-30-04
TR at 47:8-21. But Brian does remember that he personally did not put up any notrespassing signs until the late 1980s. 6-30-04 at TR 46:24 - 47:7. And when asked when
to his recollection did anybody first place locks on any of the boundary gates, Brian first
said it was the 1990s, 6-30-04 at TR 53:8-17, and a few minutes later said it was the
1980s to his recollection. 6-30-04 at TR 54:18-22.
Then petitioner Ray Okelberry testified, the dad, the main man from the beginning
in the Okelberry livestock and land operation. The only indication Ray Okelberry gave to
suggest the placement of any locks before the 1990s is as follows: simply that he "started"
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to lock two gates in 1957 or 1958, a gate on the Circle Springs Road and a gate called the
1080 gate on the Ridge Line Road. 6-30-04 TR at 98:8-18, 135:20 - 136:13. There are
several astoundingly remarkable points about this testimony:
First, Ray Okelberry's testimony conclusively and irrefutably excludes
mention of any locks on the Thorton Hallow Road or the Parker Canyon Road, half of the
roads even at issue in this appeal. It thus leaves open and unchallenged the notion that
Parker Canyon Road and Thorton Hallow Road were never locked prior to the 1980's at
all}"
Next there is no evidence that the locking of these two gates, which
"started" in 1957 or 1958, repeated, or endured. No testimony was adduced to indicate
how many continuous years, or how many years at all, this practice continued.
Next Ray Okelberry admitted that locking these two gates, for what ever
years that this occurred, lasted for a week to 10 days while when he was getting ready to
move the sheep out, as opposed to all summer. 6-30-04 TR at 138:18-20, 139:2-5.
Finally, the locks were admittedly ineffective to prohibit travel on those
roads, because Ray Okelberry freely admitted to always having trouble keeping the locks
there. "They might cut the wire off or they might cut the - 1 don't know how they got

10

One would think that Ray Okelberry of all people would testify about locks
on these roads if they existed.
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these locks off, but they'd get through the gate." 6-30-04 TR 138:20-24u
The above-documented dearth of evidence shows the true colors of the trial court's
charitable finding that the gates were locked "at various times in the past,"12 and it
strengthens one's conviction that whatever gate locking activities ensued prior to the
1980s or 1990s, they sure did not defeat ten or more years of public continuous use of the
four subject roads as often as the public found it necessary and convenient to travel them.
In the words of this Court: "We are at a loss to understand how it can reasonably be said
that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings and judgment." Bonner v.
Sudbury, All P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966).
4.

However the Controversy Over the Locked Gates May Be Characterized,
The Transcript Even More Clearly Supports The Trial Court's Findings
When Read In Light of Established Utah Supreme Court Precedent That
Grants Trial Courts Wide Discretion in Public Road Dedication Cases.

The following established precedents of this Court disfavor landowners' request to
upset and micro-manage the role of trial courts in resolving public road dedication
disputes:
a.

Draw Inferences in the Light Most Favorable to the Findings.

In reviewing claims that public road dedication rulings lack evidentiary support, it
is the appellate court's "duty to analyze the evidence and whatever reasonable inferences
11

Petitioner Ray Okelberry's critical admission is embedded in the tail end of
an answer that consumed 34 lines of transcript before his counsel interrupted to say:
"Okay. Mr. Okelberry, I think you've answered the question." 6-30-04 TR at 139:6-7.
12

Like the Chicago Cubs winning the pennant.
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may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment."
Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P. 2d 646, 647 (Utah 1966); Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow
Ranches, P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981). Before overturning trial court findings, the
reviewing court must decide that the record does not adequately support the findings,
"resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
b.

Defer to the Trial Court to Resolve Disputed Facts.

"[W]here there is dispute over whether a public use is established, determination
of the facts and resolution of the issue is primarily the responsibility of the trial court."
Bonner v. Sudbury, All P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966). "The testimony of one credible
witness, if believed by the court or jury, is sufficient upon which to base a finding of
fact." Id. "[I]t is the prerogtive of the arbiter of the facts in our judicial system to believe
or disbelieve testimony of a controverisal bent[.]" Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639,
640 (Utah 1972).
The Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah App.
1998), upheld the trial court's determination that the subject road was not a public road,
where the evidence supported a finding that the road was locked at all times as a general
rule except for a brief period each hunting season where the landowner opened the gate
for a brief period to let hunters access Forest Service ground. Id. at 807.
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"Here, the trial court explicitly found the public had not been
able to use Ridge Road as often as they found it necessary or
convenient. On the contrary, the trial court found Ridge Road
was generally barred by a locked gate[.]"
Id. at 809. Whereas the gate in Campbell was generally locked, by contrast the gates on
the subject roads in the present case were generally unlocked for a number of decades
(assuming the gates were even standing - which they often were not).
The Court of Appeals in Utah County v. Butler, 2006 Ut App 444 declined to
overturn the trial court's determination that the subject road had been used continuously
by the public for at least ten years. The Court held it was within the discretion of the trial
court to find that the gates in question were generally unlocked from about 1925 until
1980 and were used merely to restrict the travel of livestock, not people, id. at \ 15, even
through there was conflicting trial court testimony regarding the status and purpose of
gates along the subject road and whether and how often those gates made the road
impassable. Id. at ^f 12. "We are not in a position to closely scrutinize the factual
findings of the trial court in public thoroughfare dedication cases

Therefore, unless

the findings of fact are clearly unsupported by the record, we will seek only to apply the
trial court's factual findings to the law of abandonment and public dedication." Id. at %
13.
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c.

Grant Trial Courts a Fair Degree of Latitude Even in
Determining the Legal Consequences of the Facts They Do
Find.

"Historically, we have given trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the
legal consequences under [the public road dedication statute] of facts found by the court..
. . . Granting [such] discretion to the trial court is appropriate under that section, as its
legal requirements, other than the ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and
somewhat amorphous." Heber City Corp v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997)
(Citations omitted).
d.

Consider All Facts Together, Not in Isolation.

"We have no doubt that each of those facts, if considered separately, could be
rationalized as not proving a public street. But all of the facts should be considered
together . . . " Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966)
5.

Instances Where This Court Has Reversed a Trial Court's Public Road
Determination Are Distinguishable and Go Both Ways.

In Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968) the Court reversed a trial court
judgment declaring a road to be a public highway. But that decision rests on three factors
that are distinguishable from the present case. First the plaintiffs in Petersen did not
plead that the road was used as a public thoroughfare nor plead ten years of public
continuous use. Id. at 546. Here Wasatch County has plainly and consistently throughout
this litigation plead, litigated, adduced evidence and argued that the subject roads are a
public thoroughfare that have undergone more than ten years of continuous public use.
21

Secondly, given that individuals who own property in the area of the subject road "cannot
be considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in
dedication by user statutes," id, the Petersen Court had trouble with the plaintiffs' failure
to allege that members of the public other than property owners in the area even used the
road. In the present case, several persons who are not adjacent landowners but general
members of the public testified to decades of uninterrupted road use by themselves, their
friends and family and other members of the public. Thirdly, the Petersen plaintiffs' own
witness agreed that the land at the end of the subject road had no allure for the public. Id.
at 547-548. Yet in the present case it is undisputed that the subject roads lead to publicly
open and accessible Forest Service property, publicly favored camping, hunting and
sightseeing destinations, and work locations for Forest Service livestock permitees.
This Court has also reversed a trial court finding that a road is not a public
highway. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). There the record of
uncontroverted evidence satisfied the technical requirements of the public road statute.
All the trial court in that case could do to try to get around that evidence is cite some
general unspecified interest in "fairness and justice." This Court rejected that analysis:
"Once the technical provisions of that [public road dedication] section have been
satisfied, the road is a public highway. The court has no discretion to ignore that fact."
Mat 313.
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Under the authority of Heber City, it is arguable that the trial court in the present
case would have committed reversible error had it legally concluded that the subject roads
were not dedicated to the public, given its explicit findings of continuous, decades-long
uninterrupted non-permissive public use of the roads by non-landowners.
B.

The Correct Legal Test To Determine Continuous Public Use Does Not
Turn On the Mere Erection of Gates, Signs or Locks; The Correct Test
Focuses on The Extent of Public Travel And Asks Was It As Often As
the Public Found It Necessary or Convenient
The focus is on the extent and continuity of public travel, not on some per se test

for a gate, or a lock, or a sign that could produce a multiplicity of different effects and
outcomes depending on the road case and fact pattern. Was there something the
landowners did that interrupted the established flow of public travel, whatever that
established flow was? If so who cares what that "something" is. No device is too small
or demure to factor for its possible effects on the continuity of public travel; no device too
big or intimidating to dispense the required examination of public travel. In all the fuss
over the presence or absence of gates, locks and signs, we must take care not to look in
the wrong end of the telescope.
That correct legal test is a fact intensive, case-by-case inquiry, incapable of oneline jurisprudential acid tests that make, for example, a road per se public if it has a gate
but the gate is not locked, or per se private if it has merely an unlocked gate. Not that
those items are not factors, but that they are only factors as opposed to per se legal
standards in themselves on which the public or private nature of a road mechanically rises
23

or falls.
Thus the bottom line inquiry which amicus Brigham Young University should not
try to evade, is a common sense everyday factual case-by-case inquiry into whether in fact
on all the facts and circumstances, public passage and travel did or did not occur as often
as the public found it necessary and convenient. The safe, easy-to-apply standard B YU is
looking for, is to look through the right end of the telescope and record the impact of its
actions on the established pattern of public travel. Consider the following authorities in
support of this proposition:
/.

Boyer v. Clark

The Court in Boyer v. Clark found it remarkable that while the land owner posted
no trespassing signs, "no objection was made nor did any of the owners of property over
which the trail traversed attempt to interfere with public use. Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d
107, 108-09 (Utah 1958).
2.

Thurman v. Buyrum

The admitted placement of no trespassing signs on the road does not compel
reversal of the trial court's public continuous public use determination, where "[t]he signs
did not specifically refer to the use of the roadway . . . and their language was consistent
with an intent to prevent the public from leaving the roadway and entering onto adjacent
private properties." Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981).
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Moreover the Court in Thurman upheld the trial court's continuous public use
determination despite testimony that some of the use by non-property owners was with
permission, because "there was clear and convincing evidence of frequent and general use
of the road without defendants' permission." Id.
3.

Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo

The Court in Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah
1995) distinguished Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 450 (1981) by noting that there the
general public was never asked to stay off the road; whereas in Draper City the general
public was directed to stay off and the police were often called in to prevent passage. Id.,
at 1101.
4.

Gllmor v. Carter

In Gillmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964), the Court placed importance on
the placement of signs and gates, whether they actually prevented public passage or not.
This is so because the Court still paid homage to the now-abandoned requirement that
there must be evidence of landowner intent to dedicate the road to the public. Id. at 42728.13 The Court, moreover, found equally important the undisputed fact that practically

13

There is no need to prove the landowner's intent to dedicate the road to the
public. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211,213 (Utah 1981),
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995), Thurman v. Bryam,
626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P. 2d 307, 311 (Utah
1997) ("We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the language of the statute the
requirement that the owner must consent to the dedication."
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since the road's inception the landowners had entered into formal agreements granting
permissive use of the road to duck clubs and since then litigated a number of lawsuits to
assert the private nature of the road. On these two considerations (the now defunct
landowner intent requirement and the landowners' consistent behavior form the near
inception of the road), the Court agreed on the undisputed facts that no evidence of
landowner intent to dedicate a public road existed of record. Id., at 428.
J.

A WINC Corp. v. Simonsen

Despite 1996-97 era obstructions which the trial court found effectively prevented
further public travel on a mountainous, unimproved road over private property near Forest
Service ground, the trial court's determination that the road was dedicated to the public is
supported by the testimony of four individuals who did not own land in the vicinity of the
road and never asked or received permission, but who nevertheless seasonally used the
road every year "significantly more than ten years before" those obstructions, and who
commonly encountered other public users on the road during their time of use. AWINC
Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P. 3d 1228, 1230, 1231 (Utah App. 2005).
C.

The Court of Appeals5 Balancing Test Is The Best Logical Application of This
Court's Definition of "Continuous Use," Which is As Often As Convenient
and Necessary Or As Often As The Public Had Occasion or Chose to Pass.
The Court of Appeals balanced the duration and frequency of an road obstruction

against the frequency and volume of public use. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006
Utah App, 473 If 18, 153 P.3d 745. This balancing fits well with this Court's "necessary
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and convenient" test, defined as follows: For public use of a road to be continuous under
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2006), it need not consist of a great many persons or
necessarily occur every day; rather, it should occur as often as the public finds it
"necessary and convenient." Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958) (reversing
trial court's ruling that road was not public, because undisputed testimony showed that
while public use of road "was not great because comparatively few people had need to
travel over i t , . . . those of the public who had such need, did so." Id. at 108). An
accepted variation on the "necessary and convenient" standard is to inquire whether the
public used the road as often as it "had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977).
The Court of Appeals' balancing test naturally flows from this Court's "convenient
and necessary" standard, because the "as often as convenient and necessary" notion can
only be gaged and understood against the established volume and nature of use on the
subject road - whether it is a busy urban street traveled by a high volume of traffic daily
as in BYU's case, or a remote mountainous traveled infrequently and sporadically as in
the present case. On the one hand, one day's documented and carefully observed closure
of BYU's busy urban streets with their collective daily tally of 61,000 cars,14 will
obviously show that the public did not use those roads as often as they chose or had
occasion to pass. On the other hand, a several day locking of two gates on two of the four

14

BYU's Amicus Curiae Brief herein at page 4.
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lonely remote mountainous roads at issue in this case once each summer in order to move
sheep, with no telling how long those locks even stay on there, would not, and on the
record below did not, bar the public from using those roads from the 1950's to the late
1980's or early 1990fs as often as the public found it convenient and necessary to pass.
Thus the "convenient and necessary" test, applied as it was through the Court of
Appeals' balancing analysis, is inherently flexible enough to adapt to BYU's situation or
to that of a rural county. One must measure the "as often as convenient and necessary"
test against the volume of use - whether it is busy urban or remote mountainous. That is
not terribly difficult. BYU could easily meet that test with one day's closure of its roads,
just by statistically and scientifically deducing that because of that one day closure,
61,000 drivers suddenly had their routine interfered with, i.e, they "chose or had
occasion" to travel the BYU roads but could not.
CONCLUSION
The key to resolving this case in a way that addresses all concerns is to key on the
notion of interference with the established pattern and history of public use. Did
Petitioner Okelberrys' actions interfere with the public's pattern and history of use of
these four roads? The trial court was on solid footing in ruling no, not before the late
1980fs or 1990's. Does BYU's annual brief closure of its roads interfere with the
established pattern of heavy urban traffic there. Clearly it would. For these reasons, the
Court should adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis, which is really a straightforward
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application of this Court's established "necessary and convenient" test, and affirm.

DATED THIS 2nd day of July, 2007.
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